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Relying on the non-negligible role played by the underground economy in the labour 
market fluctuations, this paper extends the standard matching model à la Mortensen-
Pissarides by introducing an underground sector along with an endogenous sector choice 
for both entrepreneurs and workers. These modifications improve the quantitative 
properties of the standard matching model, thus providing a possible explanation for the 
unemployment volatility puzzle. 
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1. Introduction 
In an influential paper, Shimer (2005) shows that the standard matching model 
fails to reproduce the large volatility in unemployment and vacancies during the 
business cycle. In fact, these variables are much more volatile in the U.S. data 
than in the calibrated model subject to productivity shocks of a realistic 
magnitude. 
This is a very important setback for the profession: the reason is that the 
Mortensen-Pissarides model (1994) is the “workhorse” model used by academic 
and government economists to evaluate various economic policies and to study 
the problem of unemployment (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008). Hence, many 
and influential improvements have been offered to enrich the quantitative 
properties of the standard matching model and to challenge the unemployment 
volatility puzzle (see e.g. Shimer, 2004, 2005; Hall, 2005; Garibaldi, 2006; Uren, 
2007; Hall & Milgrom, 2008; Hagedorn & Manovskii, 2008).1 
The current paper belongs to that literature that points out the need to focus on 
the underground economy. There is in fact substantial economic activity in the 
underground sector in many developing countries as well as in many transition 
countries, and the underground sector is also important in some developed 
economies (Albrecht et al., 2009). Since these underground activities make a 
sizeable contribution to the GDP, it is difficult to understand the business cycles 
without some knowledge of the underground economy fluctuations. Indeed, 
introducing an underground sector in a Real Business Cycle framework improves 
the fit of the model to the data (Busato and Chiarini, 2004). Furthermore, Bosch 
and Esteban-Pretel (2009) build a search and matching model extended to the 
underground sector which satisfactorily explains most of the cyclical properties 
found in the Brazil data. 
This paper presents a two-sector search and matching model which addresses the 
lack of amplification in unemployment and vacancy volatility by introducing the 
sector choice of individuals. Precisely, the model assumes the exogenous 
existence of firms (posting vacancies) and workers (searching for jobs); however, 
heterogeneous entrepreneurs sort themselves into official or unofficial statuses 
                                                 
1 See Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005), Yashiv (2006) and Mortensen and Nagypál (2007), for 
exhaustive surveys of this huge and recent literature. 
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according to their ex-ante entrepreneurial ability levels, and heterogeneous 
workers direct their searches towards one of the two types of firms according to 
their ex-ante skill levels. Furthermore, entrepreneurs and workers can move from 
one sector to the other in reply to exogenous changes in policy parameters.2  
We then calibrate and simulate the model to try to account for the Shimer puzzle. 
As in Uren (2007), we compare different steady-state equilibria in which the 
value of the productivity of the match and the job destruction rate are stochastic 
and are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution constructed to match the 
stylised business cycle facts of the U.S. economy.3 The labour market tightness in 
both sectors are given at the microeconomic level and endogenously determined 
in the aggregate economy. Indeed, once the aggregate value of vacancies and 
unemployment has been calculated in reply to productivity and job destruction 
shocks, the value of labour market tightness in each sector can be obtained. This 
process triggers off two extra effects on vacancies and unemployment: the first 
works on the probabilities to find a job and fill a vacancy (direct effect), and the 
second works on the sector choice of individuals, thus modifying the share of 
entrepreneurs and workers in the two sectors (indirect effect). 
Furthermore, since in this model the zero-profit condition is no longer used to 
determine the labour market tightness, the incidence of wage on job creation is 
mediate and it is thus possible to maintain the Nash bargaining rule.4 
The main aim of this paper is to show that, once incidence of the underground 
economy on the business cycle (i.e. the sector choice of individuals) is accounted 
for, a matching model is able to replicate most of the fluctuations in 
unemployment and job vacancies caused by productivity shocks of plausible 
magnitude. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 contains a brief review of 
the related literature; sections 3 and 4 present a two-sector matching model with 
an endogenous sector choice for both entrepreneurs and workers; section 5 
                                                 
2 Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009) consider only direct transitions from informal to formal jobs. 
3 The labour productivity is the key parameter and represents the driving force in business cycle 
analysis in most macro-models of the labour market. Fluctuations in the separation rate are 
considered a further potential driving source (Garibaldi, 2006). Indeed, according to the Brazil data, 
the volatility of unemployment is explained in large part by changes in the job separation rate 
(Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009). 
4 Recall that in the standard framework (see Pissarides, 2000), the Job Creation Condition depicts a 
negative relationship between labour market tightness and wage, since the zero-profit (or free 
entry) condition directly relates the two variables. 
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provides a quantitative evaluation of an economy subject to shocks to 
productivity and job destruction rate; section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The literature has mainly responded to the Shimer puzzle by suggesting that the 
wage setting mechanism in the standard model has to be altered in order to 
break the close link between wages and productivity (Shimer, 2004, 2005; Hall, 
2005; Hall & Milgrom, 2008). Indeed, according to the literature, a principal 
reason for the lack of explanatory power of the standard matching model (in 
which the labour market tightness are obtained by the zero-profit condition) is 
that the wage implied by the Nash bargaining rule responds to offset all the 
effects of productivity shocks on job creation. Hence, following Binmore, 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), Hall and Milgrom (2008) propose a strategic 
bargaining game in which the default option, i.e. the threat point, is the delay 
rather than the search for an alternative job. This modification limits the 
influence of labour market conditions on wages.5 The insight is the following: if 
the delay is the only outside option, then the wage agreement will not reflect the 
value of unemployment and, consequently, the wage is more rigid (i.e. less pro-
cyclical) than that implied by the standard sharing rule, i.e. the Nash rule. 
Nevertheless, as claimed by Mortensen and Nagypál (2007), this solution cannot 
be sufficient to solve the Shimer puzzle by itself. 
Several papers take a different route. In particular, there is a piece of the 
literature which suggests that the problem lies not in the model itself, but in the 
way the model is typically calibrated. Hence, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) 
propose a new calibration strategy for the two central parameters of the 
Mortensen-Pissarides model: the opportunity cost of employment and the 
worker’s bargaining power. Indeed, in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the 
standard matching model may generate the observed volatility of unemployment 
and vacancies. However, as claimed by Mortensen and Nagypál (2007), they 
make use of unrealistic calibration values (i.e. a huge opportunity cost of 
employment and a tiny workers’ bargaining power) to solve the puzzle. 
                                                 
5 Using a simple rigid wage, the response in the vacancy-unemployment ratio to productivity 
shocks is still too small. Furthermore, the rigid wage assumption is difficult to justify (Mortensen 
and Nagypál, 2007). 
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Other recent papers introduce new and interesting features in the standard 
Mortensen-Pissarides model. Garibaldi (2006) shows that a calibration of the 
model that explicitly considers hiring freeze and bankruptcy of firms can account 
for 20 to 35 percent of the variability displayed by the data. Mortensen and 
Nagypál (2007) find that an augmented matching model, which includes capital 
costs, countercyclical job destruction rate and a less procyclical wage, explains 
about 40% of the observed volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Finally, 
Uren (2007) displays that the simple introduction of the endogenous decision of 
an individual to either become entrepreneur or worker can substantially amplify 
the impact of productivity shocks upon the level of unemployment and 
vacancies; such a model in fact generates fluctuations in unemployment and 
vacancies that are roughly 3 and 5 times greater than those produced by the 
standard model as evaluated by Shimer (2005). 
 
3. The economy 
The economy is populated by a continuum of entrepreneurs and a continuum of 
workers.6 Each entrepreneur is born with a specific entrepreneurial ability x, 
which is drawn from a known distribution F :[ maxmin , xx   ] [ ]1 0,→ . Similarly, each 
worker is endowed with a different level of skill q, with known distribution 
G :[ maxmin , qq   ] [ ]1 0,→ . The economic environment is characterised by a labour 
market with search frictions and wage bargaining. Each entrepreneur can either 
operate regularly or against the tax regulations. Further, our notion of 
underground employment is one of low productivity jobs (see e.g. Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2002, 2006).7 
The matching of vacancies ( v ) and unemployed (u ) per unit of time is regulated 
by an aggregate matching function: ( )iii uvmm ,=  with the restrictions 
( ) ( ) 000 == ii umvm ,,  and ( ) ( )iiii uvuvm ,min, ≤ , where { }sri ,∈  denotes the 
sector (with r = regular, s = shadow). As usual, the matching function is non-
negative, increasing, concave in both arguments and homogenous of degree one 
                                                 
6 Time is continuous, and individuals are risk neutral and infinitely lived. We neglect the 
endogenous decision of individuals to either become entrepreneurs or workers because it is widely 
discussed in the matching literature (see Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides, 2001; Pissarides, 
2002, and Uren, 2007). This framework can thus be seen as a following step. 
7 We neglect possibilities of moonlighting, so workers can perform only one activity at a time. 
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(Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), so that the vacancy-filling 
rate, ( ) ( ) ( )11 −=≡ iiiii mvuvmf θθ ,/, , and the job-finding rate, 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,/, iiiii muuvmg θθ =≡ , are both functions of the vacancy-unemployment 
ratio, iii uv /=θ . Standard technical assumptions are assumed: 
( ) 0<if θ' , ( ) 0>if θ'' , ( ) 0>ig θ' , ( ) 0<ig θ'' ; 
( ) ( ) 0limlim 0 == →∞→ ii gf ii θθ θθ , ( ) ( ) ∞== ∞→→ ii gf ii θθ θθ limlim 0 ,   with { }sri ,∈ . 
Following Garibaldi (2006), each individual takes as given iθ , and in the 
aggregate economy the labour market tightness depends on the aggregate 
number of vacancies and the stock of unemployed. 
The Bellman equations used to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions are: 
[ ]rrrr JVwprJ −⋅+−−= δτ ,  ( ) [ ]ssss JVwprJ −⋅++−⋅= ρδκ  
[ ]rrrr WUwrW −⋅+= δ ,  ( ) [ ]ssss WUwrW −⋅++= ρδ  
( ) [ ]iiiii VJfcrV −⋅+−= θ ,
  
( ) [ ]iiiii UWgzrU −⋅+= θ       with { }sri ,∈  
where Ji is the value of a filled job; Wi is the value for being employed; Vi is the 
value of a vacancy; Ui is the value for seeking a job; r is the discount rate; p is the 
productivity of the match; wi is the wage; δ is the job destruction rate; ci is the 
vacant job cost and zi is the opportunity cost of employment. In the regular sector 
firms pay a production tax τ, while in the underground sector this tax is evaded 
and there is a monitoring rate ρ. Conditional on being monitored in the 
underground sector, the irregular job is destroyed. Furthermore, as in Bosch and 
Esteban-Pretel (2009), evading taxation implies that irregular firms can only take 
advantage of a fraction ( )1 0,∈κ  of the productivity of the match. The key 
payoffs for the entry into the labour market, i.e. the value of a vacancy and the 
value for seeking a job, can be expressed as single-valued functions of tightness 
iθ , with 0>∂∂ iiU θ/  and 0<∂∂ iiV θ/  i∀  (see Appendix A).8 Finally, wages are 
assumed to be the outcome of a Nash bargaining problem: 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )iii
i
iiiiiii VJUWVJUWw ii −⋅
−
=−⇒−⋅−= − β
βββ
1
1maxarg      with { }sri ,∈  
                                                 
8 Intuitively, this is straightforward to understand since the greater θi the smaller the probability of 
filling a vacancy for the firm, and the greater θi the higher the probability of finding a job for the 
worker. 
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where ( )1 0,∈iβ  is the surplus share for labour. Simple manipulations thus yield 
the formulae of wages: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )rrrrrrrr rVyprUw θτβθβ −−⋅⋅+⋅−= 1  
( ) ( ) ( )( )ssssssss rVyprUw θβθβ −⋅⋅+⋅−= 1  
with ( ) 0>iiw θ'  i ∀ , since ( ) 0<iiV θ' , and ( ) 0>iiU θ'  i ∀ . 
 
4. Entrepreneurs and workers 
To start up a regular business an entrepreneur has to pay an extra cost h , which 
measures the burden of overall constraints in the official sector (the so-called 
barriers to entrepreneurship).9 Entrepreneurial ability x influences this start-up cost, 
but as in Pissarides (2002) it does not affect the job productivity. Therefore 
entrepreneurs whose x satisfies the following inequality enter the regular sector: 
( ) ( )ssrr VhxV θθ ≥⋅−                                [3] 
hence, regular (good) entrepreneurs have a low x, irregular (poor) entrepreneurs 
have a high x. It follows that there is a reservation entrepreneurial ability Rx = , 
with ( ) 0<rR θ'  and ( ) 0>sR θ' , such that an entrepreneur enters the official 
sector if Rx ≤ , otherwise he/she starts a business in the underground sector. 
Therefore, a fraction ( )RF  of the entrepreneurs (either posting a vacancy or 
producing) are regular, while the complementary fraction ( )RF−1  are irregular. 
The evolution of vacancies in each sector is thus given by: 
( )[ ] ( )
4342144 344 21
&
outflowinflow
rsrr fvvRFv θδ ⋅−⋅−=  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )
434214444 3444 21
&
outflowinflow
ssss fvvRFv θρδ ⋅−+⋅−−= 1  
steady-state implies 0== sr vv && , so that: 
( )
( ) δθ
δ
+
⋅
=
r
r f
RF
v
                                    
[4] 
( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )ρδθ
ρδ
++
+⋅−
=
s
s f
RF
v
1
                             
[5] 
                                                 
9 This can be explained by higher entrance barriers into the official sector or access costs to legality 
associated with excessive regulations, administrative burdens, licence fees, bribery (see e.g. Bouev, 
2005), but also money protection if the firm copes with a context where organized crime operates. 
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From the supply side, workers can be either high-skilled or low-skilled, thus 
achieving two different levels of productivity, depending on whether they 
choose to invest in education properly. Indeed, formal education enhances the 
worker’s skill (Laing et al., 1995). As in Dulleck et al. (2006), workers with higher 
ability (i.e. in the specific instance with lower q) have lower costs of higher 
education e. Therefore workers whose q satisfies the following inequality enter 
the regular sector: 10 
( ) ( )ssrr UeqU θθ ≥⋅−                  [6] 
as a result, there will be a cut-off value Q , with ( ) 0>rQ θ'  and ( ) 0<sQ θ' , 
below/equal which workers are regular/high-skilled and above which they are 
irregular/low-skilled. Then, ( )QG  and ( )QG−1  are the share of high-skilled and 
low-skilled workers, respectively. Under these assumptions, the unemployment 
rate adjusts according to the following law of motion: 
( )[ ] ( )rrrr guuQGu θδ ⋅−⋅−=&  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )ssss guuQGu θρδ ⋅−+⋅−−= 1&  
in steady-state, unemployment is thus given by: 
( )
( ) δθ
δ
+
⋅
=
r
r g
QG
u                               [7] 
( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )ρδθ
ρδ
++
+⋅−
=
s
s g
QG
u
1
                                         [8] 
In the aggregate economy, the equilibrium value of iθ  must be consistent with 
the value assumed at the microeconomic level. Formally, the aggregate definition 
of iθ  is:   
( )
( )
( )
( ) δ
δθ
δθ
δθθ
⋅
+
⋅
+
⋅
=⇒= QG
g
f
RF
u
v r
r
r
r
r
r                            [9] 
( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )[ ] ( )ρδ
ρδθ
ρδθ
ρδθθ
+⋅−
++
⋅
++
+⋅−
=⇒= QG
g
f
RF
u
v s
s
s
s
s
s 1
1
                                   [10] 
which are non-negative, by construction, since [ ]10 ,, ∈ii uv . Rearranging them, 
the equilibrium value of rθ  and sθ  must satisfy the following equations: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0=+⋅−⋅⋅+ δθδθθ rrr gRFQGg                 [9’] 
                                                 
10 Indeed, there is a strong negative correlation between informal-sector employment and education 
level within countries (cf. Albrecht et. al., 2009). 
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( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 011 =++⋅−−−⋅+⋅+ ρδθρδθθ sss gRFQGg                      [10’] 
since ( ) ( )iii fg θθθ ⋅= . A unique equilibrium exists if there is a unique value of 
rθ  and sθ  that solves equations [9’] and [10’], respectively. It is possible to verify 
that, 
Proposition 1. A steady state equilibrium exists and is unique (see Appendix C 
for the proof). Furthermore, 
Proposition 2. Given the assumption of search frictions in both sectors, the 
equilibrium is characterized by an interior solution (see Appendix D). 11 
 
This model differs from the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework because 
the effects of exogenous changes to parameters on vacancy-unemployment ratio 
depend on the variation of the threshold values. Indeed, in this model the labour 
market tightness in each sector is given by the aggregate level of vacancies and 
unemployment. The comparative static results are generally intuitive and 
straightforward, since the effects of higher monitoring, taxes and labour market 
regulations are common in the literature: 
0>
∂
∂
ρ
R
; 0<
∂
∂
τ
R
; 0<
∂
∂
rc
R
; 0>
∂
∂
p
R
; 
furthermore, this last result implies that in boom regular firms take more 
advantage of the increase in productivity (irregular jobs are less productive than 
regular ones since 1<κ ). 
 
5. Quantitative evaluation of the model 
In order to evaluate the quantitative properties of the model, a numerical 
simulation is performed. The model calibration is reported in table 1 (see end). To 
take the sectoral differences into account, we make use of Boeri and Garibaldi’s 
(2006) calibrations (see table 2). 
As in Uren (2007), we compare different steady states as the value of the 
productivity (p) and the job destruction rate (δ) vary. Consistent with the data 
presented in Shimer (2005), the productivity (p) and the job destruction rate (δ) 
                                                 
11 This is anything but a trivial result. Indeed, as claimed by Bouev (2005), the most important 
weakness in the underground economy theory is represented by the restrictive assumptions 
required to find an interior equilibrium in which the underground sector coexists with the regular 
one in the long run. 
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are stochastic and are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution constructed to 
match the stylised business cycle facts of the U.S. economy. Hence, the mean 
value of p is normalised to 1 and the standard deviation is set to 0.019, whereas 
the mean of δ is set to 0.1 and the standard deviation is set to 0.075. Finally, the 
correlation between these variables is -0.592, by construction. 
The sector choice is also solved analytically by the variation of the threshold 
values R  and Q . Both the cumulative distribution functions are assumed to be 
negative exponential.12 
The simulation works as follows: given p and δ the corresponding values of rw , 
sw , R , Q , rv , sv , ru  and su  are calculated. Furthermore, once the aggregate 
value of vacancies and unemployment has been calculated, we get the “updated” 
value of labour market tightness in each sector. In short, this process triggers off 
three effects on vacancies and unemployment, thus amplifying their volatility. 
First, the productivity and job destruction shocks work on the sector choice of 
individuals, thus modifying the share of entrepreneurs and workers in the two 
sectors (starting effect). Second, the aggregate value of labour market tightness in 
each sector works by modifying the probabilities to find a job and fill a vacancy 
(extra direct effect). Finally, the aggregate value of labour market tightness in each 
sector also affects the sector choice of individuals (extra indirect effect). 
This process is repeated 10,000 times and the correlations and the standard 
deviations of the key variables are calculated. The simulation results are shown 
in table 3. We can summarize them as follows: 13 
• Aggregate Unemployment. The standard deviation of aggregate unemployment 
( sr uuu += ) explains about 70% of the unemployment volatility observed in 
the data by Shimer (2005);  
• Aggregate Vacancies. A two-sector matching model explains more than 70% of 
the observed volatility of job vacancies; 
• Beveridge Curve. The model succeeds in correctly predicting a downward 
sloping vacancy-unemployment relationship in both sectors; 
                                                 
12 A negative exponential distribution is used by Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) for the distribution of 
labour productivity. 
13 The statistics for job vacancies and unemployment are those reported in Shimer (2005) for an 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 105 instead of 1600 as followed by 
Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995). However, as claimed by Hornstein et al. (2005), the choice of 
smoothing parameter has no impact on the unemployment and vacancy statistics. 
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• Cyclical Behaviour. The counter-cyclical behaviour of the underground 
economy is caught by the negative correlation between p and vs. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Relying on the non-negligible role played by the underground economy in the 
labour market fluctuations, this paper extends the standard matching model à la 
Mortensen-Pissarides by introducing an underground sector along with an 
endogenous sector choice for both entrepreneurs and workers. These 
modifications improve the model’s implications for the amplification of shocks, 
thus providing a possible explanation for the unemployment volatility puzzle. 
Indeed, a two-sector matching model explains about 70% of the unemployment 
volatility observed in the data by Shimer (2005), and more than 70% of the 
observed volatility of job vacancies. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix A: Value functions 
From the Bellman equations very simple algebra gives: 
[ ] ( )r
rrr
rr fr
cwypVJ
θδ
τ
++
+−−⋅
=− ;  [ ] ( )s
sss
ss fr
cwypVJ
θρδ +++
+−⋅
=−    
[ ] ( )r
rr
rr gr
zwUW
θδ ++
−
=− ;  [ ] ( )s
ss
ss gr
zwUW
θρδ +++
−
=−  
Hence, it is straightforward to get: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )r
rrrr
r fr
rcwypf
rV
θδ
δτθ
++
+⋅−−−⋅⋅
=            [A.1] 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )s
ssss
s fr
rcwypf
rV
θρδ
ρδθ
+++
++⋅−−⋅⋅
=            [A.2] 
( ) ( )
( )r
rrr
r gr
rzwg
rU
θδ
δθ
++
+⋅+⋅
=              [A.3] 
( ) ( )
( )s
sss
s gr
rzwg
rU
θρδ
ρδθ
+++
++⋅+⋅
=             [A.4] 
with 0<∂∂ iiV θ/  and 0>∂∂ iiU θ/ , { }sri  ,∈ . Further, 
τθ −−=→ rrr wpyrVlim r 0  sss wpyrVlim s −=→0θ ; ii zrUlim i =→0θ  
ii crVlim i −=∞→θ ;  ii wrUlim i =∞→θ   with { }sri  ,∈  
 
Appendix B: Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, let us define: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]δθδθθθ +⋅−⋅⋅+=Γ rrrr gRFQGg               [B.1] 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]ρδθρδθθθ ++⋅−−−⋅+⋅+=Γ ssss gRFQGg 11                 [B.2] 
and note that, 
( ) ( ) δθθ ⋅−=Γ→ RFlim rr 0 ; ( ) ( )[ ] ( )ρδθθ +⋅−−=Γ→ RFlim ss 10 ; 
( ) +∞=Γ
∞→ rr
lim θθ  and ( ) +∞=Γ∞→ sslim θθ , by the l’ Hôpital rule.14 
                                                 
14 Note that, in order to apply the l’ Hôpital rule, we can rewrite [B.1] and [B.2] as follows: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ( )




⋅⋅+
⋅+
−⋅⋅⋅+ QGg
RFgQGg
rr
r
rr θδθ
δθθδθ 1 ; 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]




−⋅⋅++
−⋅++
−⋅−⋅⋅++ QGg
RFgQGg
ss
s
ss 1
1
11
θρδθ
ρδθθρδθ . 
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Furthermore, for given R  and Q , we get: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0>⋅−⋅+=Γ rrr gRFQGg θδθθ ''' , 
if ( ) ( ) ( )RFgQG r >




+⋅
θ
δ
'
1 ; 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) 011 >⋅−−−⋅++=Γ sss gRFQGg θρδθθ '''  
if ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]RFgQG r −>



 +
+⋅− 111
θ
ρδ
'
. 
More importantly, when R  and Q  are handled as variables the previous 
result is obtained without any restriction. Indeed, since ( ) 0<rR θ' , ( ) 0>sR θ' , 
( ) 0>rQ θ'  and ( ) 0<sQ θ' , when rθ  rises, ( )RF  decreases and ( )QG  increases. 
Similarly, when sθ  rises, ( )[ ]RF−1  decreases and ( )[ ]QG−1  increases. 
Furthermore, according to the model, the labour market tightness in the two 
sectors cannot move in the same direction. Hence, their effects on R and Q 
cumulate and strengthen. As a result, equations [B.1]–[B.2] are strictly increasing 
and continuous functions of 
rθ  and sθ , respectively. Therefore, the intermediate 
value theorem implies existence of a solution to [9’]-[10’] and the monotone nature of 
( )rθΓ  and ( )sθΓ  guarantees uniqueness. 
 
Appendix C: Interior solution 
Note that we can rewrite the aggregate definition of rθ  and sθ  as the ratio 
of entrepreneurs-workers in each sector:   
( )[ ]
( )
( )
( )QG
RF
g
f
r
rr
=
+
+⋅
δθ
δθθ
              [C.1] 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )
( )[ ]
( )[ ]QG
RF
g
f
s
ss
−
−
=
++
++⋅
1
1
ρδθ
ρδθθ
             [C.2] 
it is straightforward to prove that equations [C.1] and [C.2] are equal to zero (or 
infinite) if iθ  is equal to zero (or infinite). But as shown in Appendix A, when 
0=iθ  or ∞=iθ  the value functions irV  and irU  are no longer functions of 
labour market tightness. Indeed, when 0=iθ  the vacancies are immediately 
filled and when ∞=iθ  the job-seekers are immediately employed. As a result, a 
corner solution can exist only in absence of search frictions in one of the two 
sectors. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Model calibration 
Matching function ηη −⋅= 1  iii uvm   
Petrongolo & Pissarides 
(2001) 
Parameter Notation Value Source / Target 
job-finding rate elasticity with 
respect to market tightness 
η 0.4 Uren (2007) 
matching function elasticity with 
respect to unemployment rate 
1 – η 0.6 Uren (2007) 
productivity loss in the irregular 
sector 
κ 0.81 
Bosch and Esteban-Pretel 
(2009) 
discount rate r 0.012 Shimer (2005); Uren (2007) 
bargaining power of workers β 0.50 Uren (2007);                   
Boeri & Garibaldi (2006) 
barriers to entrepreneurship     
(U.S. index) 
h 1.236 OECD (2009) 
opportunity cost of employment z 0.4 Shimer (2005) 
higher education cost                 
(U.S. index on OECD average) 
e 1.896 OECD (2009) 
vacant job cost c 0.215 Uren (2007) 
exponential distribution parameter λ 1 Boeri & Garibaldi (2006) 
Variable    
vacancies v endogenous 
law of motion 
(steady state solution) 
unemployment u endogenous 
law of motion 
(steady state solution) 
wage w endogenous Nash bargaining rule 
entrepreneurial ability threshold R endogenous cut-off condition 
worker’s ability threshold Q endogenous cut-off condition 
Key parameter    
productivity of the match p stochastic simulation 
job destruction rate δ stochastic simulation 
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Table 2. Sector calibration
∗
 
(source: Boeri & Garibaldi, 2006) 
 notation regular shadow 
production tax τ 0.20 – 
monitoring rate ρ – 0.06 
labour market tightness θ 2.70 0.16 
job-finding rate g(θ) 0.82 0.28 
vacancy-filling rate f(θ) 0.30 1.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results 
Standard deviation 0.019 0.075 0.112 0.103 0.098 0.084 
Correlations p δ vr vs ur us 
p 1      
δ -0.596 1     
vr 0.259 0.293 1    
vs -0.215 0.341 -0.014 1   
ur -0.219 0.352 -0.095 0.165 1  
us 0.186 0.323 0.185 -0.149 -0.221 1 
 
Aggregate  Statistics (standard deviation) uσ  vσ  
our calibration 0.128 0.145 
Uren’s calibration (2007) 0.124 0.087 
standard calibration (Shimer, 2005) 0.031 0.011 
volatility observed in the data by Shimer 0.190 0.202 
     
                                                 
∗
 As in Boeri and Garibaldi (2006), we assume that β and η are identical in the two sectors. Note 
that the values of labour market tightness, job-finding rate and vacancy-filling rate reported in table 
2 are the starting exogenous values of these variables. 
